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Secret communication over public channels
is one of the central pillars of a modern infor-
mation society. Using quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD)1,2 this is achieved without relying
on the hardness of mathematical problems which
might be compromised by improved algorithms
or by future quantum computers3. State-of-the-
art QKD requires composable security against
coherent attacks for a finite number of sam-
ples. Here, we present the first implementation
of QKD satisfying this requirement and addi-
tionally achieving security which is independent
of any possible flaws in the implementation of
the receiver. By distributing strongly Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen entangled continuous variable
(CV)4,5 light in a table-top arrangement, we gen-
erated secret keys using a highly efficient error
reconciliation algorithm. Since CV encoding is
compatible with conventional optical communi-
cation technology, we consider our work to be a
major promotion for commercialized QKD pro-
viding composable security against the most gen-
eral channel attacks.
Using a QKD system the communicating parties em-
ploy a cryptographic protocol that cannot be broken, nei-
ther by todays nor by future technology. The security of
the key distributed by such a system is guaranteed on
the basis of quantum theory by a mathematical proof,
which has to consider the most sophisticated (quantum)
attacks on the quantum channel, so-called ‘coherent at-
tacks’. Furthermore, security has to be established in a
‘composable’ fashion, which means that if the distributed
key is used in another secure protocol (like one-time-pad
encryption), it remains secure in the composition of the
two protocols. To make a security proof applicable to
actual implementations, it also has to include all effects
due to the finite number of distributed quantum states.
Additionally, the security proof has to model the source
and the detectors correctly. Since a completely correct
model of a detector is difficult to achieve, the proof can
be made ‘measurement-device independent’ instead, i.e.
the proof does not include any detector implementation
details at all. Thus, security cannot be compromised by
any ‘side-channels’ of the detector’s implementation, in-
cluding those which may only be discovered in the future.
To match the properties of actual implementations and
the assumptions made in security proofs, intense theoret-
ical as well as experimental research and development is
ongoing.
Here, we report the first QKD implementation that
generates a (finite) key which is secure against coher-
ent attacks and whose security is composable as well as
guaranteed independent of possible side channels of the
receiver’s detector. Theoretically, the security of our pro-
tocol has been established in Ref. 6. Following this work
we use measurement variables with continuous spectra
(continuous variables) and strongly Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen entangled light beams whose actual entanglement
strength is a crucial parameter for achieving a positive
key rate.
Our work was possible only after the security proof
of Ref. 6 was found. Other proofs did also find com-
posable security against coherent attacks7,8 but only for
an unrealistically large number of distributed quantum
states. The security of previous experimental continuous-
variable implementations, however, were restricted to the
class of ‘collective attacks’. While this class of attacks al-
ready allows an eavesdropper to possess a quantum mem-
ory, all quantum states are attacked identically using a
collective Gaussian operation. Although collective at-
tacks are in the limit of an infinite number of distributed
quantum states as strong as coherent attacks, it is cur-
rently not known whether this holds for a realistic finite
key length protocol. For collective attacks a transmis-
sion distance of 80 km was achieved with a finite number
of distributed quantum states using Gaussian modulated
coherent states9,10.
In the discrete-variable regime, first security proofs
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2providing composable security against coherent attacks
were given in Refs. 11–13. However, all of them have in
common that they require perfect single-photon sources,
which are experimentally impractical. The recent ex-
perimental demonstration reported in Ref. 14 targeted
the QKD protocol considered in Ref. 13 but it used
weak coherent pulses and, thus, an imperfect single-
photon source. To compensate for imperfect single-
photon sources, the decoy state method has been de-
veloped15,16. This method was very recently proven
composable secure against coherent attacks17 and was
implemented in Ref. 18, at around the same time as
our CV QKD implementation. To also avoid possi-
ble side-channel attacks in future discrete-variable QKD
implementations, for instance on the employed single
photon detectors19, the finite-key measurement-device-
independent protocol very recently proven composable
secure in Ref. 20 could be implemented in the future.
Figure 1. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entanglement
source for CV QKD. (a) The source consists of two
continuous-wave squeezed vacuum beams, generated by type
I parametric down-conversion at 1550 nm (red), which are su-
perimposed at a balanced beam splitter with a relative phase
of pi
2
. Yellow beam: 775 nm pump field, DBS: Dichroic beam
splitter, PS: Phase shifter. (b)-(e) Correlations between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s data, measured by balanced homodyne de-
tection in either the amplitude (X) or phase (P ) quadrature.
The data is normalized to the noise standard deviation of
a vacuum state. Blue: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled
state used for QKD. Black: Reference measurement of zero-
point fluctuations of the ground state (vacuum).
Our implemented protocol uses two continuous-wave
optical light fields which were produced by a source at one
of the communicating parties (Alice) and whose ampli-
tude and phase quadrature amplitude modulations were
mutually entangled21. Using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
entanglement as a resource makes our protocol a CV
equivalent of the BBM92 protocol for discrete variables22.
The schematic of the experimental setup is illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). Two squeezed-light sources23,24, each com-
posed of a nonlinear PPKTP crystal and a coupling mir-
ror, were pumped with a bright pump field at 775 nm
(yellow) to produce two squeezed vacuum states at the
telecommunication wavelength of 1550 nm (red). The
two squeezed vacua, both exhibiting a high squeezing
of more than 10 dB, were superimposed at a balanced
beam splitter with a relative phase of pi/2, thus gener-
ating Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entanglement21. One of
the outputs of the beam splitter was kept by Alice, while
the other was sent to her communication partner (Bob).
The technical details of the source, including the locking
scheme, were characterized in Ref. 25.
Figures 1(b)-(e) show the distribution of measurement
outcomes obtained by the two parties measuring either
the amplitude (X) or phase (P ) quadrature of their re-
spective light field with balanced homodyne detection.
Each measurement outcome is truly random since it
stems from parametrically amplified zero-point fluctua-
tions. When both parties simultaneously measure either
X or P the strong correlations between their outcomes
are clearly visible (Fig. 1 (b) and (e)). If the two par-
ties measure different quadratures instead, the measure-
ment outcomes are uncorrelated (Fig. 1(c) and (d)). The
strength of the correlations of Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment for the same quadratures, which is related to the
initial squeezing strength, is a central parameter in our
QKD protocol and enters the key length computation di-
rectly in the form of an average distance dpe, introduced
below.
The precise steps of the QKD protocol are as follows:6
Preliminaries Alice and Bob use a pre-shared key
to authenticate the classical communication channel for
post processing26,27. Furthermore, Alice and Bob nego-
tiate all parameters needed during the protocol run and
Alice performs a shot-noise calibration measurement by
blocking the signal beam input of her homodyne detec-
tor.
Measurement Phase Alice prepares an entangled
state using her Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen source and
sends one of the outputs to Bob along with a local oscil-
lator beam. Both Alice and Bob choose, randomly and
independently from each other, a quadrature X or P ,
which they simultaneously measure by homodyne detec-
tion of their light fields. The outcome of this measure-
ment is called a sample. This step is repeated until 2N
samples have been obtained.
Sifting Alice and Bob announce their measurement
bases and discard all samples measured in different
quadratures.
Discretization The continuous spectrum of the mea-
surement outcomes is discretized by the analog-to-digital
converter (ADC) used to record the measurement. Dur-
ing the discretization step Alice and Bob map the fine
grained discretization of their remaining samples caused
by the ADC to a coarser one consisting of consecutive 2d
bins. In the interval [−α, α] a binning with equal length
is used, which is complemented by two bins (−∞,−α)
and (α,∞). The parameter α is used to include the fi-
nite range of the homodyne detectors into the security
3proof.
Channel Parameter Estimation The secret key length
is calculated using the average distance between Alice’s
and Bob’s samples. To estimate it, the two parties ran-
domly choose a common subset of length k from the sifted
and discretized data, XpeA and X
pe
B , respectively, which
they communicate over the public classical channel. Us-
ing these, they calculate
dpe(X
pe
A , X
pe
B ) =
1
k
k∑
µ=1
|(XpeA )µ − (XpeB )µ| , (1)
and abort if it exceeds a threshold agreed on in the pre-
liminaries step.
Error Reconciliation Bob corrects the errors in his
data to match Alice’s using the hybrid error reconcilia-
tion algorithm described below. Afterwards, Alice and
Bob confirm that the reconciliation was successful.
Calculation of Secret Key Length Using the results
from the channel parameter estimation and considering
the number of published bits during error reconciliation,
Alice and Bob calculate the secret key length ` according
to Ref. 6. If the secret key length is negative, they abort
the protocol.
Privacy Amplification Alice and Bob apply a hash
function which is randomly chosen from a two-universal
family28, to their corrected strings to produce the secret
key of length `.
The key generated by the above protocol is proven to
be -secure against coherent attacks in Ref. 6, where 
is the so-called composable security parameter. The se-
curity proof makes no assumptions on the attacks and
only some on our implementation. First of all it assumes
that Alice’s measured quadrature angles are precisely ad-
justed to X and P , an assumption that can be overcome
as the secure key length proves to be robust against small
deviations6. Furthermore, the proof requires that Alice’s
station is inaccessible to the eavesdropper. This allows
Alice to trust her source and to determine the probabil-
ity for measuring a quadrature amplitude value exceed-
ing the parameter α. There are no assumptions on Bob’s
measurement device (one-sided device independent) such
that even attacks on his local oscillator are fully covered
and a shot-noise calibration of his homodyne detector is
not necessary.
Important for a high key rate is an error reconciliation
protocol which has an efficiency close to the Shannon
limit. Since in our CV QKD protocol the discretized
sample values are non-binary and follow a Gaussian dis-
tribution, error reconciliation codes with high efficiency
and low error rate are more difficult to achieve than for
discrete-variable protocols with uniformly distributed bi-
nary outcomes29. To solve the problem, we designed a
two-phase error reconciliation protocol which can exploit
the non-uniform distribution efficiently. First the d1 least
significant bits of each sample are sent to Bob. Since
Figure 2. Implementation of Alice’s and Bob’s QKD
receivers. Both parties used balanced homodyne detection
(BHD) to measure their part of the quadrature entangled
state. The measured quadrature angle was controlled by a
computer via a fast fiber-coupled electro-optical modulator
(EOM). To make sure that Alice and Bob switched between
the same orthogonal quadratures, a phase shifter (PS) was
employed to compensate slow phase drifts (see Methods). Op-
tical losses of the transmission channel to Bob were modelled
by a variable attenuator consisting of a half-wave plate (λ/2)
and a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The measurement rate
was 100 kHz. PD: Photo Diode.
these bits are only very weakly correlated this step works
with an efficiency very close to the Shannon limit. In a
second step Alice and Bob use a non-binary low density
parity check (LDPC) code over the Galois field GF(2d2)
to correct the d2 = d−d1 most significant bits. d1, d2, as
well as the LDPC code were optimized for the different
channel conditions and the actually employed code was
determined using the k revealed samples from the chan-
nel parameter estimation. More details are given in the
Methods.
Figure 3 shows the experimental results. First we re-
moved the variable attenuator in the transmission line to
Bob and executed the protocol for different sample sizes
to show the effect of the finite sample size on the secure
key rate (Fig. 3 (a), blue points). For each sample size the
number of samples k used for channel parameter estima-
tion was optimized before each run of the QKD protocol
to yield maximum key length. The hybrid error recon-
ciliation had a total efficiency of β = 94.6 % without a
single frame error. While we achieved a positive secret
key rate with already 5×106 samples, the secret key rate
of 0.485 bit/sample achieved for 2× 108 samples is close
to saturation. The theoretical model, which is the solid
line in the figure, is shown for comparison.
With the variable attenuator in place, we varied the
optical loss of the channel to Bob between 0 % and 16 %
(see Figure 3 (b)), which is equivalent to a fiber length
of up to 2.7 km when standard telecommunication fibers
with an attenuation of 0.2 dB/km are used and a coupling
efficiency of 95 % is taken into account. By measuring a
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Figure 3. Secure key rates achieved by our CV QKD
system. Common parameters: α = 61.6, d = 12,  =
2×10−10. (a) Effect of the finite number of distributed quan-
tum states on the secret key rate. The graph shows exper-
imental results (blue points) obtained without the variable
attenuator in Bob’s arm. The theoretical model (solid line) is
included for comparison and was calculated by reconstruct-
ing the covariance matrix for 108 samples. (b) Experimen-
tally obtained secure key rate versus optical attenuation in
the transmission line to Bob’s detector for 2× 108 measured
samples (blue points). The error bars are due to the accuracy
of the measurement of the optical attenuation. The theoret-
ical model (solid line) was calculated by reconstructing the
covariance matrix of the state corresponding to no attenua-
tion (0 dB) and using a reconciliation efficiency of β = 94.3 %.
total of 2 × 108 samples we were still able to achieve a
secret key rate of about 0.1 bit/sample at an equivalent
fiber length of 2.7 km (≈ 0.76 dB channel loss). This
value, as well as the secret key sizes at the other attenu-
ation values, were achieved by having a very high overall
error reconciliation efficiency between β = 94.3 % and
95.5 %, again without a single frame error. The theoret-
ical model shown in the figure reveals that even an opti-
cal transmission loss of almost 1.2 dB between Alice and
Bob should be possible. This corresponds to an equiv-
alent distance of about 4.8 km, which is already enough
to implement CV QKD links with composable security
against coherent attacks between parties in, for instance,
a city’s central business district.
In conclusion, we have for the first time successfully
implemented QKD with composable security against co-
herent attacks in a one-sided measurement-device inde-
pendent manner. Along with the exploitation of strong
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entanglement and a new highly
efficient error reconciliation algorithm, the innovation of
fast controlled random switching between the two mea-
sured quadrature angles made the implementation pos-
sible. Although attacks on the source of the quantum
states are not covered by the security proof6, these side-
channel attacks can be avoided to arbitrarily low proba-
bilities by adding optical isolators. While in our setup Al-
ice and Bob were located on the same optical table, they
could in principle be separated and connected by a stan-
dard telecommunication fiber (see Methods). Estima-
tions show that our implementation is limited to about
4.8 km. Longer distances will be possible by using optical
fibres with less loss, or by using reverse reconciliation30.
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METHODS
Experimental Details
The measurement rate of our implementation was 100 kHz.
For each measurement, both Alice and Bob had to choose
randomly between the X and P quadrature. The necessary
relative phase shifts of pi/2 of the local oscillator with respect
to the signal beam were applied to the local oscillator beam
by a high-bandwidth fiber-coupled electro-optical phase mod-
ulator driven by a digital pattern generator PCI-Express card.
Since not only the orthogonality of the measurements is im-
portant but also that Alice and Bob measure the same set
of quadratures, we compensated slow phase drifts by a phase
shifter made of a piezo attached mirror. The error signal for
this locking loop was derived by employing an 82 MHz sin-
gle sideband from the entanglement generation25 which was
detected by the homodyne detector. By lowpass filtering the
demodulated homodyne signal at 10 kHz with a sufficiently
high order, the high frequency phase changes from the fiber-
coupled phase modulator were averaged over. To make the
average independent of the chosen sequence of quadratures we
used the following scheme. For a choice of the X quadrature,
the phase modulator was first set to a phase of pi/2 during
the first half of the 10µs interval, and then to 0. For the
P quadrature, the phase was first set to 0 and then to pi/2.
Thus, this scheme made sure that the phase did not stay in
one quadrature for longer than 10µs even in the case where
one party chose by chance to measure only one quadrature
for a while. The measurement was performed synchronously
by Alice and Bob in the second half of the interval after 3µs
settling time.
5The data acquisition was triggered by the pattern gener-
ator and performed by a two channel PCI-Express card at
a rate of 256 MHz. The 200 acquired samples per channel
were digitally mixed down at 8 MHz, lowpass filtered by a
200-tap finite impulse response filter with a cut-off frequency
of 200 kHz and down-sampled to one sample. After the total
number of samples were recorded the classical post processing
of the QKD protocol was performed.
Alice and Bob both employed a local oscillator with a power
of 10 mW, yielding a dark noise clearance of about 18 dB.
The efficiency of both homodyne detectors was 98 % (quan-
tum efficiency of the photo diodes 99 %, homodyne visibility
99.5 %). The pump powers for the two squeezed-light sources
were 140 mW and 170 mW, respectively.
The optical attenuation of the variable attenuator used in
Fig. 3(b) was measured by determining the strength of the
35.5 MHz phase modulation used to lock one of the squeezed-
light sources25 with Bob’s homodyne detector. The error bars
in the figure are due to the accuracy of this measurement.
The security of the protocol relies substantially on the use
of true random numbers which are needed by Alice and Bob
to choose between the X and P quadrature, and to deter-
mine a random hash function during privacy amplification.
We implemented a quantum random number generator fol-
lowing a scheme of Ref. 31 which is based on vacuum state
measurements performed by a balanced homodyne detector.
For this purpose we implemented another balanced homo-
dyne detector with blocked signal port using an independent
6 mW 1550 nm beam from a fiber-laser as local oscillator. The
output of the homodyne detector circuit was anti-alias fil-
tered by a 50 MHz fourth-order Butterworth filter and sam-
pled with a sampling frequency of 256 MHz by a data acquisi-
tion card. The data was subsequently mixed down digitally at
8 MHz, lowpass filtered with a 200-tap finite-impulse-response
filter with a cut-off frequency of 5 MHz and down-sampled to
2 MHz. The generation of the random numbers from the data
stream followed the procedure in Ref. 31.
While in our implementation both parties were located on
the same optical table and the quantum states including the
local oscillator for Bob’s homodyne detection were transmit-
ted through free space, a separation is in principle possible by
using standard telecommunication fibers. To send both the
entangled state and the local oscillator to Bob, they could
be, for instance, time multiplexed. Using a dedicated fiber
for both beams would also be possible. To achieve synchro-
nization between the two parties, a modulated 1310 nm beam
could be employed which could be send along with the local
oscillator by wavelength division multiplexing.
Classical Post Processing
The main post-processing is performed with the AIT QKD
software. For the current protocol the following algorithms
are combined: (i) the binning of the synchronized outcomes,
(ii) the estimation algorithm for CV QKD, (iii) the reconcilia-
tion algorithm for CV QKD, (iv) the confirmation algorithm,
and (v) the privacy amplification algorithm. All classical mes-
sages during the protocol are authenticated with a message
authentication code using a pre shared secret key to select a
random function from a set of (almost strongly two-universal)
polynomial hash functions.
(i) First, Bob’s samples in the P quadrature are multiplied
by −1 to account for the anti-correlation. Alice and Bob then
discretize their sifted samples into 2d bins of equal size δ in the
interval [−α, α]. The remaining outcomes associated to the
intervals (−∞,−α) and (α,∞) are joined to (−α,−α+δ) and
(α − δ,∞), respectively. The 2d bins are identified with the
key generation alphabet χkg = {0, 1}d and each bin (symbol)
has a unique binary representation of d bits. Alice and Bob
obtain the binned sifted samples XsiftA ∈ χNkg and XsiftB ∈ χNkg,
respectively. Throughout the experiment we have used a key
generation alphabet of size |χkg| = 212.
(ii) In the estimation module for CV QKD the average
distance between Alice’s and Bob’s binned symbols is esti-
mated. Alice chooses a random index set E ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} of
size |E| = k for estimation and communicates E together with
the corresponding binned symbols XpeA := X
sift
A (E) to Bob.
Bob determines his corresponding binned raw key symbols
XpeB := X
sift
B (E), calculates the mean difference dpe between
XpeA and X
pe
B (see Eq. (1)), and checks that dpe ≤ d0pe. Here,
d0pe has been determined before the run of the protocol by a
theoretical estimation given the characterization of the source,
the fiber loss and excess noise. If the test passes they con-
tinue with the protocol and both parties remove the k estima-
tion samples from their sifted samples to form their raw keys
XA := X
sift
A \XpeA ∈ χN−kkg and XB := XsiftB \XpeB ∈ χN−kkg .
(iii) The reconciliation module for CV QKD implements
the hybrid reconciliation protocol. As the security analysis
assumes direct reconciliation, Bob has to correct his raw key
XB to match with Alice’s XA to generate a common raw key
X. The hybrid reconciliation used to correct Bob’s noisy raw
key operates directly on the key generation alphabet χkg. In
preparation for the hybrid reconciliation, two additional al-
phabets χˆ and χˇ are introduced such, that χkg = χˆ×χˇ. Hence,
each symbol x ∈ χkg has a unique decomposition x = (xˆ, xˇ)
with xˆ ∈ χˆ and xˇ ∈ χˇ. We take for xˆ the d2 most significant
bits of the binary representation of x, and for xˇ the remaining
d1 = d− d2 least significant bits of the binary representation
of x. We thus decompose the raw keys as X = (Xˆ, Xˇ), where
Xˆ and Xˇ denote the sequence of the d2 most and the d1 least
significant bits of each key symbol, respectively. The recon-
ciliation module performs the following steps:
(iii-a) Based on the variance of her binned raw key and the
samples XpeA and X
pe
B , Alice determines d1, d2, and the code
rate R such that the expected leakage is minimized w.r.t. the
entropy in Bob’s symbols, and transmits these parameters to
Bob.
(iii-b) Then Alice communicates XˇA to Bob who reconciles
XˇB simply by setting XˇB := XˇA. Hence, the errors which are
left in Bob’s key XB are reduced to the errors in XˆB . Non-
binary LDPC reconciliation is used to correct XˆB as described
in the next step.
(iii-c) Both Alice and Bob split their XˆA and XˆB into blocks
Xˆ
(`)
A and Xˆ
(`)
B , ` = 1, . . . ,
N−k
n
, each with n = 105 elements
of χˆ. For this step we identify χˆ with GF(2d2), the Galois
field with 2d2 elements. For each block Xˆ
(`)
A , Alice uses the
parity check matrix H of an LDPC code over GF(2d2) and
rate R to calculate the syndrome s(`) := H · Xˆ(`)A . Alice sends
the syndrome s(`) to Bob. For all elements j ∈ GF (2d2) and
for all indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the block Bob calculates the
conditional probability that (Xˆ
(`)
A )i = j, given that Bob has
obtained (Xˆ
(`)
B )i and given Alice’s value (Xˇ
(`)
A )i. Bob uses
these probabilities to initialize a non-binary belief propaga-
tion decoder.
6The non-binary belief propagation decoder operates in the
probability domain using the multi-dimensional Hadamard
transform to speed up the check node operations32. Using
the syndrome s(`) and the conditional probabilities mentioned
above, this decoder calculates Bob’s estimate X˜
(`)
A of Alice’s
block X
(`)
A .
We have constructed parity check matrices of non-binary
LDPC codes over Galois fields of order 32, 64, 128, and 256
with code rates R ∈ {0.50, 0.51, . . . , 0.95}. Each LDPC code
has a variable-node degree of two, is check-concentrated, and
has a block length of 105 symbols. We used the progressive
edge-growth algorithm33 to construct binary codes in a first
step. Then each edge has been assigned a random non-zero
element of the corresponding Galois field.33 Alice and Bob
have access to all non-binary parity check matrices.
In our proof-of-principle experiment the error reconciliation
step took about 2 h on a single CPU core for the largest data
set of 2× 108 samples. Taking into account the about 30 min
to measure the data, real-time error reconciliation could in
principle be achieved by splitting the task to e.g. 5 CPU cores.
Alternatively, to speed up the computation LDPC decoder
algorithms with reduced complexity could be employed34.
(iv) After each block has been corrected, a confirma-
tion step establishes the correctness of the protocol using
a family H of (almost) two-universal hash functions with
Probh∈RH(h(x1) = h(x2)) ≤ c for all x1 6= x2. For each
block Alice chooses a hash function h randomly from H and
communicates her choice to Bob. Alice and Bob apply this
hash function to their blocks X
(`)
A and X˜
(`)
A and exchange the
results. If their results agree the probability that Alice’s and
Bob’s blocks are different is bounded from above by c. If
their results disagree their blocks are definitely different, and
they discard them.
(v) Finally, Alice and Bob feed the sequence of all con-
firmed blocks into the privacy amplification module. Given
the accumulated leakage `LK in bits from the previous pro-
tocol steps the secure key length is calculated according to
Ref 6 as
` = (N − k)(log 1
c(δ)
− log γ(d0pe + µ))− `LK − log 1

, (2)
where c(δ) ≈ δ2/(2pi) and γ is a bound on the correlation
between Alice and Bob depending on the previously agreed
average distance threshold d0pe and statistical fluctuations µ.
Alice chooses a hash function randomly from a two-universal
hash family and communicates her choice to Bob. Then Alice
and Bob both apply this hash function to the reconciled blocks
and obtain the -secure key Ksec.
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